## 4 YEARS OF MODI PM's foreign policy forays aren't about 'resets' but a defining of India's priorities

## Modi Meets Multipolarity <br> ing and uncertain world was in 1991-



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Apowwow in Wuhan. A tete-a-tette in Sochi. In between, a dash to Berlin, a meeting and telephone chats with Donald Trump. Prime Minister NarendraModi has been onadiplomatic retired diplomats have been busy trying to makesense of itall. Cuttingout the style and show part of it - and with Modi, there is lots of that - it would seem the substance has been about making sense of a new world order, an emerging new balance of Thosestric
Those stuck within Cold War paradigms are unable to see the new and is beginning to deal with a world it has long sought. Its strategists debated whether to call it 'multipolar' or 'polycentric'. But, in the end, they all agreed that it would be a world in which there would be multiple centres of power dealing with each other in ever-changing kaleidoscope patterns of interest and power:
Thelast timean Indian primemin-
ister had to deal with a rapidly chang.

In foreign policy, India's political leadership at the very top has remained a step ahead of most of the bureaucratic-academic-media commentariat
92. The implosion of the Soviet Union wer that India had todeal with It was left to Prime Minister PV Narasimha Raotodevise ways in which India would now relate to anew worldorder. He crafted anew equation with the US, hoping it would enable India to declare itself anuclear power: Rao built on Rajiv Gandhi's outreach to Deng Xiaoping and began a new dialogue with China, while launching a new 'Look East Policy' reaching out South-Fast Asian Nations (Asean) and making new ones, like South Ko rea. He launcheda new weighbourho odpolicy that I K Gujral hijacked and dubbed as the so-called 'Gujral Doctrine. Hecrafted a new West Asia po-

## PIcking Up Speed

In short, Rao defined the new post Nehruvian, post-Cold Warforeignpolicy that stood ndia well for over two decadas. And Manmohan Sineh, built on Rao's foumdations, building a new partnership with the US, arriv Ing at a modus vivendi with China and strengthening India's links with its wider Asian neighbourhood, from the Mediterranean to the Pacific. This post-Cold War worlid, with its on ce disappeared. Modi took some time to understandand come to terms with the new world order. His foreign poli-
cy in the first two years of his tenure —


A new, new world order, really?
appeared to be nothing more than a the one hand, and Pakistani Presicontinuation of what the Rao-Vajpayeesingh paradigm crafted for the post-Cold War world, albeit onere-defined by the new phenomenon of Chinasriseatter theturnof thecentury. The financial crisis of 2008-09, the weakening of the trans-Atlantic alliacceleratedriseof Chind the US, the strongman and its impacton poighbourhood the uncertaintiesge neratedby'Trump's whimsical foreion policy, and the return of Russia ${ }^{\text {an }}$ to the world stage, have all combined to redefine the global balance of power system. For India, thisnew worldorderoffered new opportunities and posednew challenges. In the lasttwo years Modi has been coming to grips with this new reality. His global travels mustbe viewed from this perspective What is interesting about much of ne commentary on Modravelsishow theycontinue poremainonestepbehindthegovern ment in anticipating chance This is not new. Rao was ahead of the commentariat of his times, just as Singh was when he launched his dialogues with USPresident GeorgeWBush,on
ent Pervez Musharraf on the other

## A Whole New World

Those who thought they knew the world better than Singh continue to think they know the world better than Modi. Indeed, many critics of successive PMs even within the min stry of foreign affairs have been consistently proved wrong. In the realm dership at the very top has romained a stepahead of most of the bureaucr atic-academic-media commentariat Rather than view Modi's meetings with China's Xi Jinping and Russia's Vladimir Putin as resets, and a return to old ways of dealing with the world, one must view them as part of an ongoing exercise of defining Indra's foreign policy priorities given its enduring economic and strategic interests. India's foreign policy must ing economic development at home and ensuring peace and stability in itsneighbourhood. Rest follows.

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